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Child support and the SSAT: An
Anglo-Australian comparison
Professor Nick Wikeley*
This article discusses the new arrangements for reviewing decisions of the
Child Support Agency, which came into force on 1 January 2007. Since that
date the jurisdiction of the SSAT has been expanded to include merits review
of agency decisions. There has been bipartisan political support for the
introduction of a greater element of external review into the child support
scheme. This article examines the new arrangements in the light of the
experience of the child support scheme in Great Britain, where appeals
against agency decisions have been heard by tribunals modelled on those
used for resolving social security disputes since 1993. The British
experience suggests that the inquisitorial ethos of the SSAT model,
premised on a citizen v state dispute, is not necessarily well suited to dealing
with child support disputes, which are typically adversarial in nature.
Introduction
This article examines an important procedural aspect of the reforms to the
child support system which have been introduced in the wake of the report of
the Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support, chaired by Professor Patrick
Parkinson.1 The introduction of this substantial package of reforms is being
phased in over three stages. Stage 1, which commenced on 1 July 2006,
involved a number of relatively straightforward measures, such as a reduction
in the child support income cap for high income earners and an increase in the
minimum payment amount.2 The stage 2 reforms, which came into force with
effect from 1 January 2007, included provision for the independent review of
Child Support Agency decisions by the Commonwealth Social Security
Appeals Tribunal (SSAT) as well as reforms designed to improve the
inter-relationship between the child support scheme and the courts.3 The major
changes to the child support formula itself will follow from 1 July 2008, when
stage 3 will be implemented.4
The focus of this article is the decision to expand the role of the SSAT to
include independent review of agency decisions, one of the key stage 2
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1 Report of the Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support, In the Best Interests of Children —
Reforming the Child Support Scheme, FACS, May 2005.
2 Child Support Legislation Amendment (Reform of the Child Support Scheme — Initial
Measures) Act 2006 (Cth) (No 53, 2006).
3 Child Support Legislation Amendment (Reform of the Child Support Scheme — New
Formula and Other Measures) Act 2006 (Cth) (No 146, 2006), Schs 3 and 4.
4 Ibid, Schs 2 and 5–8 inclusive.
58measures. The justiﬁcation for this reform was explained by the Minister in
the following terms in the Second Reading debate on the Child Support
Legislation Amendment (Reform of the Child Support Scheme — New
Formula and Other Measures) Bill 2006:
Until now, there has been no mechanism for external administrative review of child
support decisions except through the courts, which is expensive and time consuming
for parents. The new arrangements will improve the consistency and transparency of
child support decisions and will provide a review mechanism that is inexpensive,
fair, informal and, most importantly, quick.5
The parliamentary debates on the 2006 Bill demonstrated unanimous
cross-party support for the expansion of the role of the SSAT to include review
of agency decisions. The reform was described by Liberals as ‘long overdue’6
and as introducing ‘a much greater degree of objectivity into that appeal
process’.7 It would ‘improve the consistency and transparency of child support
decisions — something that parents have been crying out for’.8 Labor
members likewise welcomed the introduction of ‘a transparent means of
reviewing child support decisions’9 which was ‘much needed’.10 This article
will explore, in the light of the experience in Great Britain,11 whether such
bipartisan conﬁdence in the potential of the SSAT both to review individual
agency decisions and to improve standards of initial decision-making
generally is well-placed.
The British experience is highly relevant in the context of the Australian
stage 2 reforms as Great Britain has operated an independent appeals process,
modelled on the social security appellate system, to resolve child support
disputes since the launch of its own Child Support Agency in April 1993.
Furthermore, the comparison of the review mechanisms in the Australian and
British child support schemes respectively is justiﬁed as the two systems share
a number of common characteristics.12 First, they both involve a national
administrative agency being charged with responsibility for the assessment,
collection and enforcement of child support liabilities.13 Secondly, both
systems use a formula (rather than discretion) to arrive at the level of child
5 Hon Mr M T Brough, Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs,
Hansard, House of Representatives, No 13, 2006 (14 September 2006), pp 2–3.
6 Mr P J Lindsay (Herbert, Qld, LP), Hansard, House of Representatives, No 14, 2006
(12 October 2006), p 22.
7 Mr K J Bartlett (Macquarie, NSW, LP), ibid, p 29.
8 Mrs L E Marcus (Greenway, NSW, LP), ibid, p 36.
9 Mrs J C Irwin (Fowler, NSW, ALP), ibid, pp 19–20.
10 Ms C F King (Ballarat, Vic, ALP), ibid, p 37.
11 In jurisdictional terms the United Kingdom operates two child support schemes — one in
Great Britain (GB), and a separate but parallel legislative framework for Northern Ireland.
However, for all practical purposes they are identical. All statutory references in this article
are to the GB scheme.
12 On the British scheme, see further N Wikeley, Child Support Law and Policy, Hart
Publishing, Oxford, 2006.
13 See ibid, Chs 5 and 6 on the inﬂuence of the Australian scheme on the United Kingdom.
Child support and the SSAT 59support awards.14 Thirdly, both schemes exclude the courts’ role in child
support matters to a greater or lesser degree.15
At the outset, however, it is important to acknowledge that there are also
some fundamental differences between the Australian CSA and its British
counterpart.16 In particular, the British scheme was retrospective in nature
from the start, as policy makers adopted a ‘big bang’approach, with the effect
that agency assessments overruled pre-existing court settlements.17 In
addition, the Australian child support scheme has always had much closer
structural, organisational and above all IT links with the tax system, whereas
in Britain, at present at least, the tax and child support authorities engage in
only very limited interchange of official data relating to individuals’
incomes.18 These and other various differences between the two regimes have
all had an impact on the relative success in operational terms of theAustralian
CSA when measured against its British counterpart.19
This article starts by summarising the development of the British child
support scheme and in particular its appeals system. The article also reviews
the debates over the years inAustralia on the appropriate means of challenging
agency decisions. The new stage 2 review arrangements in force from January
2007 are then analysed, drawing on the experience of the British system. In
conclusion, this article questions whether the SSAT in Australia will be able
to operate in a truly inquisitorial fashion when handling child support
disputes.
A brief history of the British child support scheme
The history of the British Child Support Agency has been little short of
disastrous, so much so that by comparison its Australian counterpart may be
viewed as a resounding success enjoying high levels of public support. The
Child Support Act 1991 (GB), as with its predecessor Australian legislation,
was intended to deliver child support awards which were set at a realistic level
as well as being fair, consistent, transparent and regularly reviewed and
updated. As these outcomes were to be delivered by a formula, with only a
limited role for the exercise of discretion, Mrs Thatcher’s Conservative
government followed the Australian model by establishing the Child Support
Agency to assess, collect and enforce child maintenance liabilities with effect
from April 1993. From the outset, the British CSA has been plagued with
14 See respectively Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) Pt 5 and Child Support Act
1991 (GB) Sch 1.
15 Compare Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 66E and Child Support Act 1991 (GB) s 8.
16 See J Millar and P Whiteford, ‘Child Support in Lone-Parent Families: Policies in Australia
and the UK’ (1993) 21 Policy and Politics 59 and now T Ridge, ‘Supporting Children? The
Impact of Child Support Policies on Children’s Wellbeing in the UK and Australia’ (2005)
34 Jnl of Social Policy 121.
17 Crozier v Crozier [1994] Fam 114.
18 Information sharing between the GB authorities is hampered both by the incompatibility of
agency IT systems and strict privacy laws which restrict the disclosure of tax data. The
current proposals for reform of the GB child support system, discussed in outline below,
envisage greater use of such data.
19 For comparative data see Child Support Agency, Child Support Schemes: Australia and
Comparisons 2006, Australian Government CSA, Canberra, 2006. See also Wikeley, above
n 12, Ch 6.
60 (2007) 21 Australian Journal of Family Lawsevere operational problems, especially with its IT systems, and
non-compliance with child support orders has become endemic. The ﬁrst New
Labour administration under Tony Blair, elected in May 1997, acknowledged
that the original formula was too complicated, causing long delays in
processing applications for child support. Moreover, because of the operation
of the social security system, children in the poorest families enjoyed no
ﬁnancial advantage where maintenance was actually in payment.20
A White Paper issued in 1999 accordingly set out the Blair government’s
agenda for reform.21 According to the Prime Minister, the CSA ‘was based on
sound principles. But its operation has failed to live up to them.’22 The
proposals included the radical simpliﬁcation of the formula, the instigation of
a wider range of sanctions and tougher enforcement against defaulters, the
introduction of a ‘child maintenance premium’, enabling payees on social
security to beneﬁt directly from the payment of child support and a new
improved service to be delivered by the CSA. The legislative framework for
these changes was embodied in the Child Support, Pensions and Social
Security Act 2000 (GB), which further substantially amended (rather than
repealed) the Child Support Act 1991 (GB).23
The original plan was that the new reformed scheme would commence
operations in 2001. In the event, however, serious ongoing problems with the
CSA’s IT systems meant that the start date was pushed further and further back
until eventually the 2000 Act was brought into force as from 3 March 2003.
Since that date, all new applications for child support have been dealt with
under the ‘new scheme’ formula. This uses simple percentage rates,24 similar
in principle to theAustralian model (at least before the Ministerial Taskforce’s
stage 3 reforms take effect), which depend on just two variables — the number
of children and the payer’s income.25 However, the CSA’s existing ‘old
scheme’ caseload remains subject to the original and much more complex
formula based on social security rates, which takes account of both parents’
incomes and also makes allowance for housing costs. There have been major
operational problems in transferring cases from the old (post-1993) scheme to
the new (post-2003) scheme, a process known as ‘conversion’, and from the
old to the new IT systems (‘migration’). As a result, in December 2006, more
than three years after the reforms were launched, the number of old scheme
cases (805,700), still governed by the pre-March 2003 law, substantially
outnumbered those currently handled under the new rules (584,500).26
In the face of this crisis the responsible minister, the Secretary of State for
20 Traditionally the means-tested income support scheme, which performs broadly the same
function as Family Tax Beneﬁt A, has counted child support income on a pound-for-pound
basis; in other words, in contrast to the Australian scheme, there has been no additional
‘disregard allowance’ for such income, or other measures to ensure pass through of child
support to payees who are income support claimants.
21 Department of Social Security (DSS) White Paper, A new contract for welfare: Children’s
Rights and Parents’ Responsibilities, Cm 4349, HMSO, London, 1999.
22 Ibid, p viii.
23 See N Wikeley, ‘Child Support — The New Formula’ (2000) 30 Family Law 820.
24 Namely 15% for one child, 20% for two children and 25% for three or more children.
25 See further Wikeley, above n 12, Ch 10.
26 Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), CSA Quarterly Summary of Statistics December
2006, DWP, London, March 2007, Table 1.
Child support and the SSAT 61Work and Pensions, declared in February 2006 that ‘neither the agency nor the
policy is ﬁt for purpose’ and announced a two-stage strategy for reform.27
First, the CSA published its own Operational Improvement Plan
2006–2009,28 designed to ‘stabilise and improve the performance of the
agency in the short term’.29 This included the usual tired promises about
quicker and ﬁrmer action on defaulters, including greater use of deduction
from earnings orders30 and a more active enforcement policy, involving the
contracting out to the private sector of some debt recovery work.31 The
immense scale of the systemic failings blighting the CSA was evident in a
highly critical report by the National Audit Office later in the year.32
Secondly, Sir David Henshaw33 was appointed to head a scoping team
charged with the task of redesigning the child support system to make it truly
‘ﬁt for purpose’. The Henshaw Report34 and the government’s response,35
accepting the broad thrust of the report, were published simultaneously in July
2006. In summary, the unsurprising verdict of the Henshaw Report was that
‘the CSA brand is severely damaged and its credibility among clients is very
low’.36 Henshaw’s central proposal was that the existing arrangements should
be replaced by a new system designed to tackle child poverty and to promote
private agreements for child support, with a residual role for the state.37 This
new scheme would involve tougher sanctions for defaulters and a fresh start
for the CSA’s successor organisation.
Both the Henshaw Report and the government’s initial response were short
on detail, although a White Paper published in December 2006 provided a
little more by way of information.38 The White Paper’s main proposal was to
replace the CSAwith a new Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission
(C-MEC), a non-departmental public body run by an independent board.
Subject to the necessary legislation being enacted (and a further Bill to reform
child support law is anticipated in the course of 2007), C-MEC will implement
a range of reforms to the child support system in Great Britain over the period
from 2008 to 2013, with the emphasis on encouraging parents to reach their
27 Rt Hon John Hutton MP, Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Vol 442 col 1020
(9 February 2006). See N Wikeley, ‘Child Support — Back to the Drawing Board’ (2006)
36 Family Law 312 and ‘Child Support — Looking to the Future’ (2006) 36 Family Law
360.
28 CSA (GB), Operational Improvement Plan 2006–2009, February 2006.
29 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Vol 442 col 1021 (9 February 2006).
30 This is an administrative process involving deduction of child support at source from wages,
but currently used much less in GB than in Australia.
31 See Contracting Out (Functions Relating to Child Support) Order 2006 (SI 2006/1692).
32 Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Child Support Agency – implementation of
the child support reforms, House of Commons Paper 1174, Session 2005/06, The Stationery
Office (TSO), London, 2006.
33 The retiring chief executive of Liverpool City Council.
34 DWP, Recovering child support; routes to responsibility, Cm 6894, TSO, London, 2006.
35 DWP, A fresh start: child support redesign, Cm 6895, TSO, London, 2006.
36 DWP, above n 34, p 33.
37 Encouraging private agreements is also a major theme of the latest Australian reforms: see,
eg, above n 1, Chs 13 and 15.
38 DWP, A new system of child maintenance, Cm 6979, TSO, London 2006.
62 (2007) 21 Australian Journal of Family Lawown private agreements over child support.39 The various British official
policy documents fail to address any of the problems which are associated
with the tribunal-based system for challenging agency decisions and which are
used to inform the analysis in this article of the recent Australian reforms.40
An overview of Great Britain’s child support
appeals system
There is a clear conceptual distinction in the British child support system
between complaints and appeals.41 In short, the complaints procedure is an
appropriate avenue to follow when a parent is unhappy with the level of
service provided by the agency; in itself, the complaints procedure cannot
result in a decision made under the child support legislation being altered,
although it may result in the payment of compensation.42 In contrast, a
substantive decision on a child support assessment can be changed only
through the three formal (and highly technical) statutory routes of ‘revision’,
‘supersession’ or ‘appeal’, three procedures which have been inherited from
the social security jurisdiction. In principle, the fundamental difference
between the ﬁrst two internal methods of review (revision and supersession)
is simple: revision is a means of changing an initial decision which was
wrong, with effect from the date of that original decision, whereas
supersession is a means of substituting a new decision with effect from some
later date, for example because of a subsequent change in circumstances.43
The only external means of challenging an agency decision is by way of
appeal to a tribunal. Applicants are not required to exhaust the internal
processes of revision and supersession before an appeal to a tribunal is lodged,
although as a matter of practice the agency will conduct an internal
reconsideration of its decision in any case in which an appeal is lodged.44
When child support appeal tribunals were ﬁrst established under the 1991
Act, they comprised three members, including a legally qualiﬁed chair, but
since 1999 they have typically consisted of a lawyer chair sitting alone.45
These lawyer members are either salaried independent full-time judicial office
holders (known as District Chairmen) or part-time chairs, typically local legal
practitioners.46Although the lawyer member usually now sits alone, this is not
always the case; he or she may be joined on a two-person tribunal by a
39 For doubts about this policy, see House of Commons Work and Pensions Select Committee,
Child Support Reform, Fourth Report, Session 2006/07, House of Commons Paper 219-I,
TSO, London, 2007.
40 See D Burrows, ‘Child Support: What the White Paper Doesn’t Say’ (2007) 37 Family Law
242.
41 Whether this distinction is clear to the CSA’s customers is less obvious: see N Wikeley et al,
National Survey of Child Support Agency Clients, DWP Research Report No 152, London,
2001, Ch 7.
42 There is an Independent Case Examiner — effectively a specialist ombudsman — who deals
with complaints which are not resolved through the agency’s internal procedures.
43 See further Child Support Act 1991 (GB) ss 16 and 17.
44 An internal review was a prerequisite for an appeal under the original Child Support Act
1991 (GB), but this requirement was abolished by the Social Security Act 1998 (GB).
45 See, generally, N Wikeley, ‘Burying Bell: Managing the Judicialisation of Social Security
Tribunals’ (2000) 63 Mod LR 475.
46 See Social Security Act 1998 (GB) ss 6 and 7(2) for the qualifying criteria for appointment.
Child support and the SSAT 63ﬁnancially qualiﬁed panel member (ie, an accountant).47 The legislation
provides that such a two-person tribunal should sit to hear child support
appeals raising ‘issues which are, in the opinion of the President, difficult’and
which relate to matters such as the interpretation of accounts,48 typically
involving self-employed payers.49 Appeal tribunals dispose of appeals either
following an oral hearing or in the absence of the parties at a ‘paper hearing’.
Once the decision had been taken in Great Britain to use social security
tribunals rather than courts as the avenue for child support appeals,50 then the
model of the social security jurisdiction led logically to the creation of a
further appellate tier in the form of the child support commissioners.51 The
title ‘commissioner’ in this context is somewhat misleading,52 as he or she is
a judicial office holder appointed by HM The Queen. Moreover, appeals to the
commissioner lie exclusively on a point of law53 and so in Britain only the ﬁrst
instance appeal tribunals offer a form of merits review on the facts. There is
no means of avoiding the tribunal with a referral direct to the commissioner.
The commissioner will normally determine the case on the papers, on the
basis of the parties’ written submissions, but oral hearings are held in a
minority of cases.54
There is, accordingly, a hierarchy of decision-making in the British child
support scheme, mirroring the social security model: initial decisions are
taken by agency officers, acting on behalf of the Secretary of State, thereafter
tribunals and commissioners provide two levels of independent appellate
scrutiny, although only the former offer merits review. Tribunal members and
commissioners hold judicial appointments which now fall within the remit of
the new independent Judicial Appointments Commission in England and
Wales55 — therefore, at least for the purposes of the British understanding of
these terms, shorn of the Australian constitutional niceties, the SSAT and the
child support commissioner both clearly exercise a judicial rather than
executive function.56 There is a further right of appeal on a point of law from
47 Exceptionally a further member may be appointed, eg, for the purposes of judicial induction:
Social Security and Child Support (Decisions andAppeals) Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/991),
reg 36(5).
48 Ibid, reg 36(3)(b). In practice, the president does not exercise this judgment on an individual
case-by-case basis; instead, district chairmen typically give directions in appropriate appeals
for the case to be listed before a tribunal which includes a ﬁnancially qualiﬁed member.
49 Child Support Commissioner’s decision CCS/872/2000.
50 See further Wikeley, above n 12, pp 414–16.
51 Not without some adverse comment; see, eg, Lord Simon of Glaisdale’s complaint about the
‘fragmentation of our system of judicature in order to provide additional specialisation’:
Hansard, House of Lords Debates, Vol 528 col 1810 (16 May 1991).
52 Of course, the potential for confusion will be that much more as and when the Child
Maintenance Enforcement Commission (C-MEC) is established. However, the title of the
current child support commissioners is likely to change in any event as a result of proposals
in the Tribunal, Courts and Enforcement Bill 2007 (GB) to create a new upper tribunal.
53 Child Support Act 1991 (GB) s 24.
54 On the work of the commissioners generally, see T Buck, D Bonner and R Sainsbury,
Making Social Security Law: The role and work of the Social Security and Child Support
Commissioners, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2005.
55 There are separate arrangements for Scotland and Northern Ireland respectively.
56 In contrast, of course, the Australian Constitution precludes the SSAT exercising judicial
power; in practice, however, both SSATs perform a very similar function in deciding
appeals.
64 (2007) 21 Australian Journal of Family Lawthe commissioner to the Court of Appeal (or in Scotland to the Court of
Session). This specialist statutory regime means that the ordinary civil courts
are largely bypassed in terms of dealing with appeals from the CSA’s
decisions, although they retain the jurisdiction to make child maintenance
consent orders and to deal with paternity disputes and enforcement matters.57
The slow road to independent review of child support
decisions in Australia
In contrast to the British system, the Australian child support scheme has
traditionally prioritised systems of internal review over external and
independent merits review. Over the years, several official reports have
recommended the introduction of a more accessible form of external review
as a means of challenging CSA decisions. The matter was ﬁrst considered by
the Child Support Evaluation Advisory Group in 1992, which indicated a
preference for an expedited process of review or appeal through registrars of
the Family Court.58 TheAdvisory Group also explored the option of review by
an administrative tribunal, but this was regarded as unsuitable in the then
prevailing circumstances.59 The Advisory Group also noted the government’s
announcement of the decision to establish an internal review system, as from
1 July 1992, under which Child Support Review Officers (CSROs) would
reconsider formula liabilities on the basis of a departure, or what is now
known as a ‘change of assessment’.60 There was, however, insufficient detail
available at that stage for the Advisory Group to form a view as to the
appropriateness of this procedure.61
The CSRO system for challenging agency decisions was examined by the
Joint Select Committee on Certain Family Law Issues in its 1994 report (the
Price Report) which examined various models for restructuring the review
system.62 The Price Report stressed the importance of seeing reviews as a
three-tiered end-to-end process. First, it recommended the creation of a proper
internal review system, which it described as an objection procedure, for all
administrative decisions and applications for departure from the formula
assessment.63 Secondly, it proposed a new process for external review, a Child
Support Appeals Office, with matters being heard by an appeals officer sitting
alone.64 The Joint Committee appear to have envisaged this appellate body as
representing an amalgam between a more independent CSRO and the existing
SSAT. Thirdly, the Price Report recommended that further appeals from the
newAppeals Office should go either to the Family Court (if relating to a point
of law) or to a specialist child support division within the AAT (if concerning
57 See further Wikeley, above n 12, Ch 13.
58 Child Support Evaluation Advisory Group (CSEAG), Child Support in Australia, AGPS,
Canberra, 1992, Vol I, p 264.
59 Ibid, p 263.
60 Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) Pt 6A.
61 CSEAG, above n 58, pp 263–4.
62 Joint Select Committee on Certain Family Law Issues, The Operation and Effectiveness of
the Child Support Scheme, AGPS, Canberra, 1994, Ch 12.
63 Ibid, paras 12.37–12.43 and Recommendation 76.
64 Ibid, paras 12.44–12.46 and Recommendations 77–80.
Child support and the SSAT 65an administrative decision).65 It was only the ﬁrst of these proposals that was
eventually implemented by government, with the result that the objections
procedure was grafted on top of the CSRO process. The courts remained as a
back-stop, but otherwise there remained no external and independent system
of tribunal-based review of agency decisions.As a result, in broad terms there
were three principal mechanisms for challenging CSA decisions in place
immediately before the reforms implemented on 1 January 2007.
The ﬁrst, and most important in practice, was the objections procedure,
which enabled a different officer of the agency to reconsider the decision in
issue and, if appropriate, reach a fresh determination.66 The objections
procedure, introduced with effect from July 1999 as a belated response to the
Price Report, remains in place after the January 2007 changes and provides a
form of internal review against most agency decisions, including ‘change of
assessment’decisions by Senior Case Officers, as CSROs are now known (and
which are determined de novo at the objections stage).67 These cases involve
parents who feel that the standard formula outcome produces an unfair result
in their particular circumstances and so have applied for a ‘change of
assessment’ on one or more of a number of speciﬁed grounds.68 This is
certainly one area in which the Commonwealth Ombudsman has been critical
of the agency’s decision-making and review processes,69 although hard
evidence of inconsistency is lacking.70
Secondly, a parent who was dissatisﬁed with the outcome of the objections
procedure could appeal to a court with family jurisdiction.71 In practice
relatively few such challenges have reached the courts.72 This right of appeal
remains in place after 1 January 2007, subject to certain modiﬁcations, but
now only after review by the SSAT.73
Lastly, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) had a limited and even
more rarely invoked jurisdiction to review certain CSA decisions, largely
65 Ibid, paras 12.47–12.54 and Recommendations 81–4. For criticism of this proposal, see G T
Riethmuller, ‘Reviewing the Method of Review’ (1995) 9 AJFL 95 at 119.
66 Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) Pt 6B and Child Support (Registration and
Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) Pt VII.
67 Garnaut v Child Support Registrar [2004] FCA 1100 (unreported, 25 August 2004,
BC200405439). A decision under Pt 6A on change of assessment is not subject to judicial
review: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 3 and Sch 1, Item (s).
68 Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) s 117; see further L Young, ‘Child Support:
A Practical Approach to the Change of Assessment Process’ (2002) 8 Current Family Law
45.
69 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Child Support Agency: Change of Assessment Decisions,
Report No 1/2004, Canberra, 2004.
70 The analysis in the Ombudsman’s report is not always convincing: see N Wikeley and
L Young, ‘Smith v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions: child support, the
self-employed and the meaning of “total taxable proﬁts” — total confusion reigns’(2005) 17
Child & Family Law Quarterly 267 at 288. As Riethmuller has argued in an earlier context,
inconsistency is assumed rather than demonstrated: above n 65, at 118.
71 Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) s 110 and Child Support (Registration and
Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) Pt VIII. Courts with jurisdiction include the Family Court, the
Federal Magistrates Court, state and territory Magistrates Courts and the Family Court of
Western Australia.
72 S Henderson-Kelly, ‘Does the Child Support Sacred Cow Milk Parents of Administrative
Justice?’ (2005) 44 AIAL Forum 26 at 34.
73 Unless it is a complex departure case: see below n 106.
66 (2007) 21 Australian Journal of Family Lawrelating to procedural matters.74 This jurisdiction has now been mostly (but
not entirely) subsumed by the SSAT.75
So what led to the stage 2 reforms of January 2007? Dissatisfaction with the
system for reviewing agency decisions re-emerged in 2003 with Every Picture
Tells a Story, the report of the House of Representatives Standing Committee
on Family and Community Affairs.76 While recognising that the change of
assessment process was an improvement on the previous court-based system,
the Standing Committee pointed out that this remained an internal review
process — accordingly, in something of a throw-away line, it recommended
‘a proper external review process similar to the Social Security Appeals
Tribunal processes’.77 Such a review process could have formed part of the
remit of the Joint Committee’s proposed, but ill-fated, Families Tribunal.78
The matter was then further reviewed by the Report of the Ministerial
Taskforce on Child Support, which was published in May 2005.79 The
Taskforce Report expressed the opinion that ‘the continuing absence of an
accessible administrative review process external to the Agency appears
unsustainable’.80 The Taskforce Report, recognising the case that had been
made for CSA decisions being subject to external review by the SSAT,81
argued that:
Inexpensive, expeditious external review in a non-court based, less adversarial,
multi-disciplinary style ﬁts well with the new approach that will unfold with the
development of Family Relationship Centres.82
Accordingly the Taskforce Report, although recognising the potential role
for courts in dealing with departure directions, otherwise than as a review of
a tribunal decision,83 called on the government to consider the introduction of
some form of external review mechanism, using either an existing or a new
tribunal.84 Strictly, consideration of this issue was outside the taskforce’s
terms of reference, as Professor Parkinson has since publicly acknowledged.85
In February 2006 the government announced its decision to accept the
74 Eg, relating to extension of time limits and remission of penalties: Child Support
(Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) ss 98ZE and 98ZF.
75 The AAT retains its jurisdiction to review certain decisions relating to departure prohibition
orders (DPOs) made under Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth): see
s 72T and on control by the courts see ss 72Q–72S.
76 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and CommunityAffairs, Report of
the Inquiry into Child Custody Arrangements in the Event of Family Separation, Every
Picture Tells a Story, Canberra, 2003.
77 Ibid, para 6.133.
78 Ibid, para 6.217 Recommendation 29; but see the Hon J Howard MP, Reforms to the family
law system, Media Release, 24 September 2004.
79 Above n 1.
80 Ibid, p 249 (section 17.2.2).
81 T Wolffs, ‘External Review of Child Support Agency Decisions: The Case for a Tribunal’
(2004) 43 AIAL Forum 55.
82 Ministerial Taskforce, above n 1, p 249 (section 17.2.3).
83 As well as the agency-based change of assessment process, the courts have an original
jurisdiction in certain circumstances to order a departure from the formula: see Child
Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) s 116.
84 Ministerial Taskforce, above n 1, Recommendation 23.
85 Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Reference: Child Support Legislation
Amendment (etc) Bill 2006, 4 October 2006, CA 53.
Child support and the SSAT 67taskforce’s proposals, and in particular to give the SSAT jurisdiction to review
agency decisions.86
Review of child support decisions in Australia
since 1 January 2007
External review and the case for the SSAT
The case for the reform of the system for reviewing Child Support Agency
decisions was not difficult to make. Effective internal mechanisms for
monitoring the quality of agency decisions are vital to ensure high standards,
but the absence of public accountability through a proper system of external
review of agency decisions has always been something of an anomaly in the
overall landscape of Australian administrative justice. The question then, of
course, was to determine the appropriate model for independent scrutiny of
agency decisions. The case for the courts to do so was less than
overwhelming, given the funding implications and concerns about the courts’
accessibility and expedition. The creation of a wholly new tribunal to deal
with such reviews would arguably be both undesirable in principle and an
inefficient use of scarce public resources. Once the government had dismissed
the idea of a Families Tribunal, the most likely solution was always going to
be the adaptation of an existing tribunal. On that basis commentators noted
that the obvious contender was the SSAT. As Professor Parkinson has since
explained, echoing the SSAT’s statutory objective, ‘The advice that I gave to
the department when they were considering this was, “Whatever you do, make
it quick, simple and cheap”.’87
Most notably, Tammy Wolffs, in an article which clearly inﬂuenced the
Ministerial Taskforce, identiﬁed three principal advantages associated with
review by a tribunal. The ﬁrst was that ‘conﬂict between parents may be
signiﬁcantly reduced’.88 This was partly because tribunals would operate in a
less adversarial fashion and partly because the agency (rather than the other
parent) would be the effective respondent. The second was that a tribunal’s
inquisitorial approach ‘would mean that the process would be less formal and
less costly’.89 The third was that establishing a tribunal ‘may also improve
normative decision-making processes’ by providing more timely and
comprehensive feedback than review by the courts.90 Wolffs’s conclusion was
that the SSAT should be given the role of external merits review over child
support decisions.91 In doing so, she identiﬁed a number of reasons why the
SSAT was the most appropriate model, not least because Centrelink and the
CSA both fell within the same ministerial portfolio and their caseloads were
similar in socio-economic terms. Wolffs noted, however, that SSAT
procedures would need to be adapted as ‘any decision made by the CSA
86 Department of Family and Community Services, ‘Child Support Reforms To Deliver Fairer
System’, Press Release, Canberra, 28 February 2006.
87 Senate Standing Committee, above n 85, CA 53. See also below n 98.
88 Wolffs, above n 81, at 67.
89 Ibid, at 67.
90 Ibid, at 67–8.
91 Ibid, at 68.
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the experience in Great Britain, it is arguable that the new Australian
arrangements do not pay sufficient heed to this special nature of child support
disputes within the wider framework of administrative justice.
An overview of the new review system
Since the implementation of the stage 2 reforms in January 2007, dissatisﬁed
parents have ﬁve means open to them to challenge Child Support Agency
decisions, as summarised in the agency’s glossy brochure Your Options. These
are (1) using the agency’s complaints process (with the further option of
lodging a complaint with the Commonwealth Ombudsman); (2) objecting to
an agency decision; (3) applying to the SSAT; (4) applying to the AAT; and
(5) applying and appealing to court. The focus of this article is on the third of
these routes, namely, review by way of application to the SSAT. The details of
the new system for reviewing agency decisions were enacted by the Child
Support Legislation Amendment (Reform of the Child Support Scheme —
New Formula and Other Measures) Act 2006 (Cth).93 Section 3 of the 2006
Act introduces the various Schedules to the Act, of which the most important
in the present context is Sch 3, which amends the review provisions in the
Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth). The discussion
that follows refers to the provisions of the 1988 Act, as so amended, unless
otherwise stated.
Part VII of the 1988 Act deals with internal objections procedures for
certain decisions, and incorporates provisions relating to internal review
which have been transferred over from the Child Support (Assessment) Act
1989 (Cth). The object of this Part, as set out in s 79E, is to provide for internal
reconsideration of decisions of the registrar before the decisions may be
reviewed by the SSAT under the new Pt VIIA. Part VII is largely a question
of statutory good housekeeping, as the overall impact of the relevant
provisions is mostly unchanged from the position before 1 January 2007.
Thus, in outline, parents can object to certain decisions of the registrar under
the Assessment and the Registration and Collection Acts94 by lodging such an
objection within 28 days of the notiﬁcation of the disputed decision.95 The
objection ‘must state fully and in detail the grounds relied on’.96 The registrar
must serve copies of the grounds of objections on other interested parties, who
in turn have the right to make representations.97 Under s 87 of the Act the
registrar must then consider the objection and within 60 days either allow (in
whole or in part) or disallow the objection. One difference as compared with
the previous arrangements is that the registrar is no longer deemed to have
made a decision to disallow the objection if the 60 day limit passes without the
decision being made.
The brand new Pt VIIA of the 1988 Act deals with SSAT review of agency
decisions and comprises seven Divisions. Division 1 provides the simpliﬁed
92 Ibid, at 69.
93 No 146, 2006.
94 As speciﬁed in the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 80.
95 Ibid, s 81 — on extensions of time see ss 82 and 83.
96 Ibid, s 84.
97 Ibid, ss 85 and 86.
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objective of providing a mechanism of review that is fair, just, economical,
informal and quick’.98 Divisions 2 and 3 of Pt VIIA concern applications for
review and parties respectively, while Divs 3A, 4 and 5 deal with pre-hearing
conferences, hearings and decisions on review. Division 6 consists of a single
enabling provision, s 103ZA, which empowers the SSAT executive director
and an SSAT presiding member to make general or speciﬁc directions for
handling reviews under Pt VIIA. The discussion that follows examines the
most important provisions in Divs 2 to 5 inclusive.
Parties before the SSAT
Section 101(1) of the 1988 Act deﬁnes those who are parties for the purposes
of SSAT proceedings: these are the applicant, the registrar, any person who is
entitled to apply for a review (which by implication will typically be the other
parent) and anyone who has been joined as a party by the executive director.
As to the last category, anyone ‘whose interests are affected by the decision’
may apply to be joined as a party.99 Two points may be made about this
provision as a whole. First, children are speciﬁcally excluded from its
scope.100 The second issue concerns the potential breadth of the executive
director’s discretion to join any person ‘whose interests are affected by the
decision’.101 A liberal reading of this rule would enable either parent’s new
partner to apply to be joined to the proceedings, a prospect which seems less
than desirable. Presumably the question of standing will be determined by
whether the individual has a genuine personal interest that may be affected by
the decision, not that they simply have an interest in the decision.102 In the
British scheme, however, only ‘qualifying persons’— typically the payer and
payee — have the right of appeal to a tribunal103 and the parties to the
proceedings are those persons with a right of appeal and the Secretary of
State.104 There is no power to add any other persons as parties and no evidence
that the absence of such a power has caused any particular difficulty in
practice.105
Applications to the SSAT
The Australian SSAT’s new review jurisdiction is effectively deﬁned by
s 89(1) of the 1988 Act, which provides that a party may apply to the SSAT
for review of the registrar’s decision under s 87 (under Pt VII) on an objection
(or against an application for an extension of time to lodge an objection). The
98 Ibid, s 88. This goal is taken, of course, from the social security jurisdiction: Social Security
(Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 141.
99 Child Support (Registration and Collection)Act 1988 (Cth) s 101(2). This mirrors the power
in Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 156.
100 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 101(3).
101 See also ibid, s 102, providing for those who are not parties but may be affected by the
decision to be given notice of the application.
102 Dudzinski and Department of Family and Community Services [1999] AATA 860 at
[45]–[52] supports a narrow construction of the joinder rule.
103 Child Support Act 1991 (GB) s 20.
104 Decisions and Appeals Regulations 1999 (GB), above n 47, reg 1(3).
105 See, eg, Denson v Stevenson (reported as R(CS) 2/01) at [21].
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where that decision is that an application for a departure is too complex to be
decided within the agency and so the case is to be transferred to court for
determination.106 It follows that an applicant must ﬁrst exhaust the agency’s
internal procedures before applying to the SSAT for review. In some cases this
will mean no more than pursuing the objections procedure; but a dispute over
a change of assessment must be considered ﬁrst by a Senior Case Officer and
then be challenged through the objections process before the applicant may
apply to the SSAT — and it is only after the SSAT that (in certain
circumstances) the court’s jurisdiction may be invoked. This is a jurisdictional
assault course,107 and the Law Council of Australia has expressed the concern
that:
very few people will last the distance if they have a genuine gripe with the system.
Most people ﬁnd that the system wears them down by the time they have been
through the review and objection process and do not take it any further.108
This concern is supported by the experience of child support reviews in the
Great Britain. Under the Child Support Act 1991 (GB), as originally enacted,
the independent child support appeal tribunal (CSAT) could not hear an appeal
unless the matter had already been the subject of a mandatory internal
‘second-tier review’ within the agency.109 This procedure, allied with the
Child Support Agency’s own administrative inefficiency and operational
problems, resulted in serious delays in appeals being heard. The statutory
requirement for an internal review in the British scheme was subsequently
repealed with effect from 1999. Even since its abolition, only a small
proportion of the agency’s customers today lodge appeals with the tribunal in
Great Britain.110
Applications for review by the SSAT are subject to a 28-day time limit;111
this is the same as the limit operated initially in Great Britain, although since
1999 a ‘one month rule’has applied there, which was thought to be clearer and
simpler to apply. The 28-day deadline for applying to the SSAT may be
extended,112 although the legislation does not seek to deﬁne what may be
permissible reasons for a late application for review.113 Ultimately this is a
matter for the exercise of discretion, subject to the guidelines developed in the
106 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 89(2); see Child Support
(Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) ss 98E and 98R.
107 Similarly, Centrelink decisions are subject to Original Decision Maker (ODM) review,
followed by scrutiny by an Authorised Review Officer (ARO) before the SSAT can be
involved.
108 Mr D Farrar, Treasurer and Executive member, Family Law Section, Law Council of
Australia in Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Reference: Child Support
Legislation Amendment (etc) Bill 2006, 4 October 2006, CA 12.
109 G Davis, N Wikeley and R Young, Child Support in Action, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998,
Ch 6.
110 The CSA’s caseload is approximately 1.4 million; in 2005 tribunals heard only 3045 child
support appeals (less than 2 % of the SSAT caseload): Hansard, HC Debates, Vol 445,
col 124W (18 April 2006).
111 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 90.
112 Ibid, ss 91–93.
113 See by way of contrast the Decisions and Appeals Regulations 1999 (GB), above n 47,
reg 32 on late appeals.
Child support and the SSAT 71case law.114 The application procedure itself is extremely ﬂexible — the
application may be made in writing to either the agency115 or the SSAT, or
direct to the SSAT itself in oral form, including by telephone.116 The
desirability of the facility for oral applications, especially by telephone, was
questioned by the Law Council of Australia, which argued that the initiation
of the review process required careful reﬂection at a time when ‘emotional
responses are common’.117 The counter-argument, of course, is that the system
needs to be accessible and responsive to users, not all of whom will
necessarily be comfortable in articulating their grievances on paper.118
The documentation relating to the review and
restrictions on disclosure
Once an application has been properly lodged, the registrar must send to the
SSAT executive director a statement about the decision under review,
which sets out the ﬁndings of fact made by the agency, refers to the evidence
on which those ﬁndings were based and gives the reasons for the decision.119
This must be accompanied by the original or a copy of every document or part
of a document that is in the possession, or under the control, of the registrar;
and is relevant to the review of the decision.120 This paperwork must be
provided within 28 days.121 However, there is clearly some scope for
disagreement here, as views may legitimately differ as to whether a document
‘is relevant to the review of the decision’. Certainly tribunal members in
Britain complain that the agency fails to produce relevant documentation in a
timely and comprehensive manner.
The Australian scheme has the potential for added contention as the
registrar may apply to the SSAT for a direction that certain papers be
withheld.122 The SSAT executive director may make such a direction, either
on the registrar’s application or of his or her own initiative:
prohibiting or restricting the disclosure to some or all of the parties to a review of
the contents of a document or statement . . . that relates to the review if he or she is
satisﬁed that it is desirable to do so because of the conﬁdential nature of the
document or statement, or for any other reason.123
114 See Re Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services and Roberts (2003) 73
ALD 412; Laing and Child Support Registrar (2004) 85 ALD 223 drawing on, eg, Hunter
Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen, Minister for Home Affairs and the Environment
(1984) 3 FCR 334; 58 ALR 305.
115 See further Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 95(1) where an
application needs to be forwarded to the SSAT.
116 Ibid, s 94. The option of lodging an appeal direct with the SSAT is a marked improvement
on the position in Great Britain, where appeals must be lodged with the CSA in the ﬁrst
instance: Decisions and Appeals Regulations 1999 (GB), above n 47, reg 33.
117 Family Law Section, Law Council ofAustralia, Submission to the Senate Community Affairs
Committee, para 23.
118 This informal means of application has been borrowed from Social Security
(Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 154.
119 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 95(3)(a).
120 Ibid, s 95(3)(b).
121 Ibid, ss 95(3) and 96(1).
122 Ibid, s 97.
123 Ibid, s 98(2). See by comparison Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 169.
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Australia. Its Family Law Section noted the reluctance of the agency ‘to
require the provision of all relevant ﬁnancial documents to the other party in
change of assessment matters’.124 There was a clear risk, it argued, that
relevant documents — eg, tax returns and business accounts — would be
regarded as being of a ‘conﬁdential nature’ and so not be disclosed. The Law
Council’s position was clear:
unless the document would be privileged from production in court proceedings then
production should be compellable for SSAT proceedings. Full and frank disclosure
of all relevant information and documents is fundamental to the proper resolution of
all aspects of ﬁnancial issues between former partners, including liability for or
eligibility to receive child support.125
The potential for tension between this power to withhold information and
normal principles of procedural fairness is self-evident.126
In this context we may note that the British scheme has no such
wide-ranging power for tribunals to limit disclosure of relevant documents.
On the contrary, the only relevant provision which permits non-disclosure is
a narrow rule which enables the address of either parent, or any information
which might lead to their being located, to be withheld.127 In practice the
agency in Great Britain can be over zealous in seeking to protect parties’
conﬁdentiality, with the result that all sorts of relevant material may be
excised from the papers (eg, the name and address of a party’s lawyer or
accountant).128 But subject to this rule, any relevant evidence must be made
available to all parties.129 Indeed, British law goes further than this, in that the
agency has statutory authority to disclose information about one party to a
child support assessment to another party where it is necessary to do so in
order to explain certain speciﬁed types of decision which it has made.130 As
Hale LJ (as she then was) observed, ‘the rules of natural justice require that
the information needed to explain the end product is communicated to both
parties in a maintenance assessment’.131 In contrast, the Australian provision
enabling information to be withheld seems to be drawn unnecessarily widely
and can hardly help the cause of justice not only being done, but being seen
to be done. The failure to provide any right of appeal against the executive
director’s decision to issue such a direction only compounds the problem.
124 Family Law Section, Law Council of Australia, above n 117, para 26.
125 Ibid, para 27.
126 On procedural fairness, see, eg, Applicant Veal of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 225 CLR 88; 222 ALR 411.
127 Decisions and Appeals Regulations 1999 (GB), above n 47, reg 44; see also the special rule
relating to conﬁdential medical evidence in reg 42, which is unlikely to arise in the child
support context.
128 See the discussion in Child Support Commissioner’s decision R(CS) 3/06, where the law
governing disclosure was described as ‘a bewildering hotchpotch’ at [19] per Mr
Commissioner Jacobs.
129 See, eg, Commissioner’s decision CCS/1925/2002 (hearing unfair where evidence was sent
by payer to tribunal but not disclosed to payee until a few minutes before the hearing over
two months later).
130 Child Support (Information, Evidence and Disclosure) Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/1812)
(GB) reg 9A(1).
131 Huxley v Child Support Commissioner [2000] 1 FLR 898 at 906.
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disclosure of all relevant documentation. The SSAT’s wide power to impose
restrictions on the disclosure of conﬁdential information has already been
noted and criticised above. However, the new scheme makes provision for the
SSAT to require disclosure from parties in three ways. First, the SSAT
executive director may ask the registrar ‘to provide the SSAT with information
or a document that the registrar has and that is relevant to the review of a
decision’.132 The registrar must comply with such a request as soon as is
practicable and in any event within 14 days. Secondly, where a person has
relevant information, or custody or control of relevant documents, the
executive director may ask the registrar to exercise his or her powers under the
child support legislation to obtain evidence and information.133 Lastly, the
executive director may require a person to provide information, to attend the
SSAT for questioning or to produce relevant documents ‘if it is reasonably
necessary for the purposes of a review’, with the penalty for non-compliance
being imprisonment for up to six months.134
The ﬁrst two of these powers exist in the SSAT’s normal social security
jurisdiction,135 but there is no equivalent to the third power, as the SSAT has
traditionally lacked the power to compel the production of documents by
individual parties.136 The last of these powers is also stronger than its
equivalent provision in the British scheme. Tribunals there may issue
directions and summons witnesses, but there is no real sanction to ensure that
parties comply, other than the drawing of adverse inferences.137 However, the
SSAT’s powers are still weaker than those that apply in ordinary civil
litigation. Moreover, it is unclear whether evidence obtained by the SSAT
from one party in the exercise of these powers has to be disclosed to the other
party.138 The existing internal review process within the agency has been
criticised because, so it is said, ‘either party can assert facts which are false,
exaggerated or misleading but which cannot effectively be challenged’.139
Much will therefore depend on the initiative shown by the SSAT in requiring
disclosure of all relevant evidence, especially using its new power to compel
attendance and the production of evidence. In the absence of a proactive
stance by the SSAT, there is a serious risk, especially where parties are
unrepresented, that factual assertions will not be properly tested under these
procedures.
Striking out appeals
We should also note that the SSAT executive director has the power to dismiss
an application for review in certain circumstances, including where the
132 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 103J.
133 Ibid, s 103L; see further ibid, s 120 and Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) s 161.
134 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 103K.
135 Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) ss 165 and 166.
136 N Bedford and R Creyke, Inquisitorial Processes in Australian Tribunals,AIJA, Melbourne,
2006, p 17.
137 Decisions and Appeals Regulations 1999 (GB), above n 47, regs 38(2) and 43; and see
Commissioner’s decision R(CS) 6/05.
138 Note that at present evidence obtained by SCOs under Child Support (Assessment)Act 1989
(Cth) s 161 is not automatically disclosed to the other party.
139 Family Law Section, Law Council of Australia, above n 117, para 31.1.
74 (2007) 21 Australian Journal of Family Lawapplication is ‘frivolous or vexatious’.140 This particular ground may only be
relied upon where the executive director has ‘received and considered
submissions from the applicant . . . has otherwise communicated with the
applicant in relation to the grounds of the application’or ‘has made reasonable
attempts to communicate with the applicant in relation to the grounds of the
application and has failed to do so’.141 In addition, all of the other parties must
consent to the dismissal of the application. The purpose of this provision is
said to be ‘to ensure that people are given a right to be heard, and that a matter
is not dismissed without the SSAT considering the matter before deciding that
it is vexatious or frivolous’.142 However, this right to be heard might be better
characterised as a right to have one’s submissions considered, which is not
quite the same thing, as there is no presumption of an oral hearing to
determine the matter. In contrast, the British scheme operates a two-tier
system for the dismissal of certain applications. First, the rules provide for
either tribunal chairs or clerks to strike out appeals on the basis that they are
out of jurisdiction, for want of prosecution or for non-compliance with
directions.143 Secondly, tribunal chairs (but not clerks) may strike out
‘misconceived appeals’,144 which are deﬁned as those which are ‘frivolous or
vexatious’ or one which is ‘obviously unsustainable and has no prospect of
success, other than an out of jurisdiction appeal’.145 Any such misconceived
appeal cannot be struck out in the British scheme without affording the
applicant an opportunity to put his or her case at a preliminary oral hearing.
There is no such guarantee in the Australian scheme.
The hearing before the SSAT
The Australian legislation encourages active case-management by making
provision for pre-hearing conferences where the executive director ‘considers
that it would assist in the conduct and consideration of the review to do so’.146
Such a pre-hearing conference may be used to narrow the issues for resolution
and to give directions for the hearing of the review. Clearly this type of
meeting would also provide the opportunity for the prospect of alternative
forms of dispute resolution, such as mediation, to be explored. The British
scheme does not operate pre-hearing conferences, although tribunal chairmen
may and do issue directions on the further conduct of an appeal. The proactive
use of such pre-hearing conferences will be important as a means of avoiding
repeated adjournments, which are a serious problem under the British
140 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 100(1)(b).
141 Ibid, s 100(2).
142 House of Representatives, Child Support Legislation Amendment (etc) Bill 2006,
Explanatory Memorandum, p 114.
143 Decisions and Appeals Regulations 1999 (GB), above n 47, reg 46. On reinstatement, see
ibid, reg 47.
144 Ibid, reg 48.
145 Ibid, reg 1(3).
146 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 103.
Child support and the SSAT 75arrangements.147 As many as 30% of child support appeals are adjourned in
Britain, almost twice the average rate (17%) for social security tribunals
generally.148
So far as the hearing itself is concerned, SSAT panels will normally consist
of two members.149 Majority decisions are possible, but if the tribunal is
evenly split the presiding member has the casting vote.150 The procedure in the
SSAT is meant to be informal; so, for example, the tribunal ‘is not bound by
legal technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence’.151 It is easy for
politicians and policy-makers to champion the merits of the informality of
tribunals over the undue legalism of the courts, but the reality is more
complex.152 As Genn has warned, analysis of the procedures and outcomes of
informal tribunal and court hearings suggests that:
despite procedural informality, the matters to be decided at hearings often involve
highly complex rules and case law; that procedures remain inherently ‘adversarial’
and often legalistic; that the adjudicative function has not always adapted well to the
new forums; that those who appear unrepresented before informal courts and
tribunals are unable sufficiently to understand the proceedings to participate
effectively; and that decision-making processes for many types of problem remain
traditional. The result of these shortcomings is that, in the absence of the
conventional ‘protections’ of formality, such as representation, and the rules of
evidence, the cases of those appearing before informal tribunals and courts may not
be properly ventilated, the law may not be accurately applied, and ultimately justice
may not be done.153
Parties to the hearing are entitled to make oral and/or written submissions
to the SSAT.154Aparty may also have another person make submissions on his
or her behalf.155 This would imply that a party may have a legal
representative,156 although the Law Council of Australia’s argument that this
option should be made explicit was rejected by the government. Officials
clearly hope that parties will not engage lawyers ‘as a review mechanism is a
deliberate step away from adversarial court proceedings’.157 This raises an
important question as to how far SSAT proceedings may be regarded as
genuinely inquisitorial, an issue which is explored further below. We should
147 Note also ibid, s 103R, implying that a maximum of two adjournments would be the norm.
148 Appeals Service, Report by the President of Appeal Tribunals on the standards of
decision-making by the Secretary of State 2005-2006, Appeals Service, 2006, pp 47 and 49.
On the principles governing adjournments generally, see N Harris, ‘Adjournments in social
security tribunals’ (1996) 3 Jnl of Social Security Law 11.
149 The maximum size for an SSAT panel is four members, although the norm is two: Social
Security Administration Act 1999 (Cth) s 139 and Sch 3, paras 10 and 11. See also Child
Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 103M on designation of SSAT chair.
150 Ibid, s 103U.
151 Ibid, s 103N(1).
152 See Riethmuller, above n 65, pp 106–12.
153 H Genn, ‘Tribunals and Informal Justice’ (1993) 56 Mod LR 393 at 398.
154 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 103C(1).
155 Ibid, s 103C(2).
156 See by analogy Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 161. In fact only about
6.5% of SSAT hearings involve a legal representative: L Blacklow and R Matthews, ‘The
Rise and Rise of Tribunals’, 8th Annual AIJA Tribunals Conference, Sydney, June 2005.
157 Senate, Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Child Support Legislation Amendment
(etc) Bill 2006 [Provisions], October 2006, p 44.
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no express right to put questions directly to other persons.158 Submissions may
however be made by telephone or other electronic means, for example where
a party lives in a remote area or is unable to travel because of illness or
disability.159
The evident expectation is that hearings will be oral in nature, although
hearings may be conducted without oral submissions if all parties agree and
the executive director considers that the matter can be resolved fairly on the
basis of written submissions.160 The primacy of the oral SSAT hearing is in
contrast to the British arrangements, under which a party must actively opt for
an oral hearing, failing which the case will be dealt with at a so-called ‘paper
hearing’.161 The SSAT may take evidence on oath or affirmation.162 This
power also exists in the British scheme,163 although views differ amongst
tribunal chairmen there as to the value of this procedure.164
There are a number of other differences between the Australian and British
arrangements for tribunal review. Children, as well as not being parties to the
review, may not give evidence to the SSAT in Australia.165 The exclusion of
children is said to be to protect them ‘from being pressurised to support a
particular parent’s or carer’s position’.166 No such exclusion operates in the
British scheme, but in practice children are very rarely, if ever, asked to give
evidence. If they do, there are clear guidelines from the case law on whether,
and if so how, children should give evidence.167 The blanket ban in the
Australian legislation on children giving evidence may be criticised as being
unduly paternalistic and not in keeping with the principles of the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child.168
A further and fundamental difference between the two jurisdictions
concerns the openness of the hearing. In Australia, SSAT review hearings on
child support matters must be in private,169 although the executive director
may give directions as to those who may be present, bearing in mind the
parties’ wishes and the need to protect their privacy. The emphasis given to
privacy is reinforced by the executive director’s power to make an order
requiring any person present not to disclose information obtained in the course
of the hearing.170
The British approach is very different. At the outset of the child support
158 Contrast the provision in Decisions and Appeals Regulations 1999 (GB), above n 47,
reg 49(11).
159 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 103C(3) and (4).
160 Ibid, s 103D; see also s 103E.
161 Decisions and Appeals Regulations 1999 (GB), above n 47, reg 39.
162 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 103G.
163 Decisions and Appeals Regulations 1999 (GB), above n 47, reg 43(5).
164 See E Jacobs and G Douglas, Child Support: The Legislation, Edition Seven 2005/2006,
Thomson: Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2005, pp 485–7.
165 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 103H.
166 House of Representatives, above n 142, p 119.
167 See the detailed discussion in Jacobs and Douglas, above n 164, pp 483–5.
168 See especially UNCRC, Art 12(1).
169 This reﬂects the position in social security appeals: Social Security (Administration) Act
1999 (Cth) s 168.
170 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 103Q.
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chair directed otherwise.171 The default position changed in 1999 with the
introduction of a presumption that hearings should be in public — as is the
case with social security appeals in Britain — unless the appellant requested
a private hearing or the chair made a direction to that effect.172 That
presumption was further strengthened in 2002, when the appellant’s absolute
right to request a private hearing was abolished. The chair may still decide to
convene the hearing in private, for example ‘for the protection of the private
or family life of one or more parties to the proceedings’.173 The justiﬁcation
for this further change was to ensure full compliance with Art 6(1) of the
European Convention on Human Rights, which provides for a person’s civil
rights and obligations to be determined by ‘a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law’.
This degree of openness has not caused any problems in practice, as it is
extremely unusual, if not unheard of, for members of the public (other than
those closely connected with the parties) to attend a hearing. The real problem
arises from the fact that any party before the tribunal in Great Britain has the
right to be present and to be heard, and may be accompanied by a
representative of their choice, whether or not he or she is professionally
qualiﬁed.174 This may result in considerable tension at the hearing, for
example where a parent insists on being accompanied and represented by a
new partner, who then has the right to put questions to the other parent.
Whether or not the same phenomenon occurs in Australia, child support
hearings inevitably generate strong emotions, so the Australian SSAT
authorities are reviewing the security arrangements at hearing venues.175
The role of the agency in the SSAT hearing
Arguably the most signiﬁcant difference between the two schemes lies in the
role that the agency may play in SSAT hearings. In Australia, the default
position is that the registrar may make written submissions and may request
permission to make oral submissions, which will be granted if the executive
director considers that these would assist the SSAT, given its statutory
objective of providing ‘a mechanism of review that is fair, just, economical,
informal and quick’.176 In the British scheme the agency always provides a
written submission to the tribunal and has the right, along with any other party,
to attend the hearing and make oral representations. Accordingly, the agency
may send a ‘presenting officer’ to the hearing. The role of ‘presenting officer’
was developed in the social security jurisdiction, with such staff being
expected to act as a type of lay ‘amicus curiae’,177 so as to assist the tribunal
171 Child SupportAppeal Tribunal (Procedure) Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/2641) (GB) reg 11(7)
(now repealed).
172 Decisions and Appeals Regulations 1999 (GB), above n 47, reg 49(6) as originally enacted.
173 Ibid, reg 49(6)(b), as amended by SI 2002/1379, reg 14(a).
174 Decisions and Appeals Regulations 1999 (GB), above n 47, reg 49(7)(a) and (8).
175 Social Security Appeals Tribunal, Annual Report 2005–06, ACT, 2006, p 38.
176 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 103F; see also s 88.
177 Or ‘friend of the court’; see N Wikeley and R Young, ‘Presenting Officers in Social Security
Appeal Tribunals: The Theory and Practice of the Curious Amici’ (1991) 18 Jnl of Law and
Society 464.
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be a problematic role in social security appeals in Britain, given that
presenting officers are departmental staff, but they face further difficulties in a
child support appeal in that they may feel obliged to explain and defend the
agency’s decision in front of two warring parents.
It follows that seating arrangements for the child support hearings need to
be carefully reviewed. For example in 2006 the Child Support Agency in
Great Britain expressly asked the President of the Appeals Tribunals if the
presenting officer (PO) could normally be allowed to sit in the position closest
to the door. One Regional Chairman indicated to his judicial colleagues that
‘the safety of a PO is neither more nor less important than the safety of anyone
else in the tribunal room, and it must always be a matter for the discretion of
the chairman as to who sits where’.178 The child support commissioners have
emphasised the importance of presenting officers attending tribunal hearings,
given ‘the tripartite nature of child support proceedings and the need for the
tribunal to take account of every possible consideration that may affect the
children themselves’.179 In recent years, much to the irritation of both the
appeal tribunals and the commissioners,180 the norm has been for the
department to fail to send a presenting officer to hearings of social security
appeals, and non-attendance now appears to be a serious problem in child
support tribunals as well. However, when such officers do attend, appeals
service chairmen have speciﬁcally commended the standard of presentation in
child support cases.181 Their presence serves several purposes: their expertise
in the agency’s internal processes can assist the tribunal, and their availability
for questioning can assist in demonstrating the tribunal’s independence, so
providing a degree of public accountability.
The decision of the SSAT
The SSAT’s power on review is to affirm, vary or set aside the decision; in the
last case the tribunal must either substitute its own decision or remit the matter
to the registrar for reconsideration.182 In doing so the SSAT is essentially put
in the shoes of the registrar, so it may exercise the same powers and
discretions and is subject to the same limits to those powers or discretions.183
Unlike its British counterpart, theAustralian SSAT may make a consent order,
for example following settlement at a pre-hearing conference.184 A written
notice of the SSAT’s decision must be sent to the parties within 14 days, which
178 Letter dated 1 August 2006 on ﬁle with author.
179 Commissioners’ decision CCS/2618/1995, at [11] per Mr Commissioner Howell QC. This
should include taking ‘an active role in challenging the case put forward by the parties
attending the appeal, and drawing attention to possible opposing arguments or
interpretations of the facts’.
180 And also the Council on Tribunals: see Annual Report 2003/2004, House of Commons Paper
750, Session 2003/04, London, TSO, p 23.
181 Appeals Service President’s Report, above n 148, p 36.
182 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 103S. This is effectively the
same as with the British SSAT: see Child Support Act 1991 (GB) s 20(8).
183 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 103T.
184 Ibid, s 103W.
Child support and the SSAT 79must also advise the parties of their right of appeal.185 The tribunal must also
either advise the parties orally of the reasons for its decision and inform them
of their right to request written reasons or give the parties a written statement
that sets out the tribunal’s ﬁndings of fact, the evidence relied on and its
reasons.186 This is similar to the British procedure, under which the parties are
informed of the decision and handed a summary typed decision notice on the
day, with the right to apply for a full statement of reasons.187 Although the
Australian procedure is silent about any record of proceedings, it is
understood as a matter of practice that all hearings will be tape-recorded and
that parties will be able to request (on payment) a copy of the transcript. In
Britain it is the chair’s statutory responsibility to maintain a written note of the
proceedings, and parties are entitled to apply for a copy of that note free of
charge.188 In practice this is often an important document for the appellate
body (in Britain, the child support commissioner) to consider alongside the
tribunal’s decision and statement of reasons. As in Britain, however, there is
no provision to make orders for costs as between the parties, although the
SSAT may order that the Commonwealth pay travel costs associated with the
review, typically in attending the hearing.189
Appeals from SSAT decisions
In social security matters decisions of the SSAT are subject to further merits
review by the AAT.190 The position is very different in child support cases:
a party to a SSAT review of a child support decision has the right of appeal
against the tribunal’s decision, but on a question of law only, and to a court
having jurisdiction, namely, the Family Court, the Federal Magistrates Court
and certain state and territory courts.191 In effect this is similar to the proposed
regime for SSAT appeals generally to theAAT which the Senate rejected when
the Administrative Review Tribunal Bill failed to pass in 2000. The appeal
against a SSAT child support review decision must be brought within the
relevant time limits.192 The legislation does not deﬁne ‘a question of law’, but
the term has been interpreted fairly expansively in Great Britain. It includes,
therefore, decisions which disclose any of the following errors: false
propositions of law, absence of jurisdiction, inadequate ﬁndings of fact,
inadequate reasons and breaches of natural justice.193 Although a challenge to
the SSAT decision is by way of appeal to a court on a point of law, rather than
merits review before the AAT, there is no requirement to seek permission to
appeal, as applies in Great Britain. The Australian SSAT, again unlike its
British counterpart, also has the power, of its own motion or on application,
185 Ibid, s 103X(1).
186 Ibid, s 103X(3).
187 Decisions andAppeals Regulations 1999 (GB), above n 47, reg 53 – the British rules operate
a one month time limit, rather than 14 days, for such a request.
188 Ibid, reg 55.
189 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 103Z.
190 Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 179.
191 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) ss 104 and 110B.
192 Ibid, s 110C.
193 Jacobs and Douglas, above n 164, pp 82–91. These are broadly mirrored as grounds for
review in the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 5.
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agreement of the executive director.194 When hearing any appeal, a court may
admit further evidence and ﬁnd facts,195 subject to the restriction that any such
ﬁndings of fact are not inconsistent with those made by the SSAT.196
The SSAT and child support reviews: an inquisitorial
or adversarial procedure?
At this juncture we need to return to the case that was made for external merits
review of agency decisions by a tribunal, and speciﬁcally review by the SSAT.
It will be recalled that Wolffs advanced three arguments for child support
decisions to be reviewed by a tribunal. The ﬁrst two reasons were both
associated with the avowedly inquisitorial approach of tribunals.197 It was said
that ‘conﬂict between parents may be signiﬁcantly reduced’,198 partly because
tribunals would operate in a less adversarial fashion and partly because the
agency (rather than the other parent) would be the respondent. Wolffs also
contended that a tribunal’s inquisitorial approach ‘would mean that the
process would be less formal and less costly’.199 On further analysis, however,
these arguments may be overstated for at least two reasons.
First, as a matter of principle, the notion of inquisitorialism itself is a
contested and much misunderstood concept. In the context of Australian
tribunals generally, Bedford and Creyke have already observed that:
The term inquisitorial is misleading to the extent that it suggests that tribunals
operate in a mode akin to that practised in civil law systems. The traditional
European notion of what ‘inquisitorial’ means does not translate precisely to the
Australian scene, not least because of the need in Australia to provide a more
efficient and cost effective form of adjudication than the courts. Australia has set up
a hybrid adversarial-inquisitorial process with distinct features.200
Bedford and Creyke’s conclusion was that Australian tribunals do not
operate in a truly inquisitorial fashion, as ‘the culture of adversarialism in
Australia is too strong for an alternative mode of procedure to be adopted’201
(although, as ever, much will depend on the qualities of the presiding
member). This is a particularly important observation in the context of vesting
the SSAT with child support review powers. In short, social security appeals
are by deﬁnition ‘citizen v state’disputes, whereas most child support appeals
are, by their very nature, tripartite and many are bitterly contested.202 We may
note in this context that the Law Council of Australia argued that the SSAT is
not an appropriate forum to hear an inter partes dispute. The formal reply of
194 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 110H.
195 Ibid, s 110G.
196 Other than ﬁndings made by the SSAT as the result of an error of law: ibid, s 110G(1)(a).
197 The third argument relates to feedback to decision-makers — see further below.
198 Wolffs, above n 81, at 67.
199 Ibid, at 67.
200 Bedford and Creyke, above n 136, p 66.
201 Ibid, p 66.
202 This was reﬂected in commissioner’s decision CCS/2/1994, where the commissioner advised
tribunals to adopt a primarily inquisitorial approach to issues between the payer or payee and
the agency, but a primarily adversarial approach to disputes between the payer and payee.
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as follows:
The SSAT is to review administrative decisions made by the CSA, not to adjudicate
inter partes disputes. A parent is objecting to a decision by the Registrar or delegate
of the Registrar — they are not actually disputing with the other parent, although the
other parent may be joined as a party to the review.203
This response is, at best over simplistic and at worst disingenuous. Whatever
the formal nature of the proceedings and the status of the various players, a
child support review is typically a zero-sum game — any gain by one parent
(eg, a successful application by a payer for a change of assessment) means a
loss for the other (eg, a consequential reduction in income for the payee). In
reality, therefore, the other parent’s interests are directly in issue, so
reinforcing the culture of adversarialism. Arguably, child support reviews are
perhaps best seen as a form of hybrid process. As one British child support
commissioner has observed: ‘the proceedings may be adversarial as between
the two parents but the role of the Secretary of State in child support cases is
investigatory.’204
Secondly, the British experience has demonstrated empirically the severe
practical and legal limits to the inquisitorial process in the child support
context. In the same way as its Australian counterpart, the SSAT in Great
Britain has traditionally espoused an inquisitorial approach, with an
‘investigative function [that] has as its object the ascertainment of the facts
and the determination of the truth’.205 So the tribunal ‘is not restricted, as in
ordinary litigation where there are proceedings between the parties, to
accepting or rejecting the respective contentions’ of the claimant and the
department.206Allied with the ‘enabling role’identiﬁed by early researchers as
a goal for such tribunals,207 this has been a central tenet of the corporate
philosophy of the social security tribunals in Great Britain since the early
1980s.208 The child support commissioners were quick to reinforce this
approach: thus child support tribunals were ‘under a general duty to inquire
into all material issues to which a case before them gives rise’; furthermore,
they were ‘there to determine the true entitlements and obligations of the
people involved in the cases before them, and are not limited by the opposing
contentions made to them’.209 Indeed, in principle, at their inception, British
child support tribunals had the potential to be more inquisitorial than their
social security counterparts, in that they were given powers to summon
witnesses and to order the production of documents, which originally had no
203 Senate Standing Committee, above n 157, p 43.
204 CCS/2861/2001, at [7] per Mr Commissioner Rowland.
205 R(S) 4/82, at [25] per Tribunal of Commissioners. This approach has consistently been
approved by the higher courts; see, eg, R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner; Ex
parte Moore [1965] 1 QB 456 at 486; [1965] 1 All ER 81. See also Kerr v Department for
Social Development [2004] 4 All ER 385; [2005] 1 WLR 1372.
206 R(S) 4/82, at [25].
207 See especially K Bell, Research Study on Supplementary Beneﬁt Appeal Tribunals, DHSS,
London, 1975.
208 See Wikeley, above n 45, at 494–5.
209 CCS/12/1994, at [46] per Mr Commissioner Howell QC.
82 (2007) 21 Australian Journal of Family Lawparallel in the arena of social security.210
However, subsequent research has demonstrated that tribunal practice in
relation to both social security and child support appeals has often fallen some
way short of the inquisitorial ideal: despite the apparent informality of
tribunals, ‘procedures remain inherently “adversarial” and often legalistic’.211
In addition, early research in the ﬁeld of child support found that tribunals
were reluctant to use their extra powers.212 There is no doubt that in some
cases the poor record of the agency in investigating cases at ﬁrst instance has
put the British tribunals in an impossible position. They must somehow
reconcile a commitment to an inquisitorial approach, and so judicially
‘determine the true entitlements and obligations of the people involved in the
cases before them’,213 while striving to avoid the perceptions of bias that may
arise if they appear to be doing the agency’s job for it.214 Moreover, as would
be expected given the contested nature of such cases, the evidence from Great
Britain demonstrates much higher levels of dissatisfaction amongst appellants
with tribunals dealing with child support matters than with general social
security appeals.215 But, whatever the agency’s performance, the tribunals’
efforts to adopt an inquisitorial approach are hindered in practice by the
adversarial stance that many parents adopt in child support appeals. The same
culture of adversarialism may undermine efforts by the SSAT in Australia to
operate in an inquisitorial fashion.
The SSAT and feedback: improving normative
decision-making processes
In addition to the perceived advantages of the inquisitorial approach offered
by tribunals, Wolffs argued that tribunals ‘may also improve normative
decision-making processes’ in the agency.216 In short, her contention was that
a tribunal such as the SSAT may provide more timely and comprehensive
feedback than review by the courts, given the more intensive degree of
oversight provided by a tribunal-based appeals process. This argument has
been echoed by the official assertion that the new arrangements ‘will improve
the consistency and transparency of decisions’in the child support scheme.217
Yet the basis for this bold claim is by no means immediately obvious.
210 The powers in the Decisions and Appeals Regulations 1999 (GB), above n 47, regs 38 and
43 are now of general application. See Child Support (Registration and Collection)Act 1988
(Cth) s 103K discussed above.
211 Genn, above n 153. See also J Baldwin, N Wikeley and R Young, Judging Social Security,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, Ch 4 and H Genn, B Lever and LGray, Tribunals for diverse
users, DCA Research Report 1/2006, DCA, London, 2006.
212 See Davis, Wikeley and Young, above n 109, pp 148–52.
213 Above n 209.
214 See Mr Commissioner Powell’s warnings in CCS/61/2003, at [8] and CCS/4503/2003, at
[12].
215 See, eg, Davis, Wikeley and Young, above n 109, Ch 7; R Young, N Wikeley and G Davis,
‘Child Support Appeal Tribunals: The Appellant’s Perspective’ in M Partington and
M Harris, Administrative Justice in the 21st century, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1999, Ch 13
and Wikeley et al, above n 41, Ch 7.
216 Wolffs, above n 81, at 67–8.
217 Department of Families, Community Services and IndigenousAffairs, Reforming Australia’s
Child Support Scheme, Factsheet 4: Stage Two — Changes to the Scheme from January
2007.
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standards in evaluating evidence, ﬁnding facts and recording their reasons,
and if these standards are then communicated to agency decision-makers.
Although SSAT members will be familiar with both the intricacies of social
security law and the realities of living on low incomes, they may not
necessarily be specialists in the ﬁeld of child support law. The British
experience suggests that an intensive and substantial program of training for
SSAT members will be required. Feedback from tribunals also depends on a
sufficient volume of cases making it as far as the SSAT as well as an effective
system for reporting and promulgating decisions. It is questionable whether
transparency will necessarily be improved, given that the agency’s senior case
officers, who handle change of assessment applications, and objection officers
already provide reasons for their decisions.218
Indeed, the contention that external review is automatically the best way to
improve internal decision-making is a large and contestable claim.219 While
the force of this argument may seem self-evident to the lawyer, there is a
considerable body of empirical and theoretical literature relating to
administrative justice which suggests the matter is not so simple.220 There is,
for example, a respectable school of thought that internal quality control
mechanisms are a more effective tool for improving adjudication standards in
government agencies than the availability of external review, whether that be
by a tribunal or a court.221 Furthermore, the decision-making of ‘street level
bureaucrats’222 may be inﬂuenced more by factors such as their agencies’
internal performance indicators than the (relatively remote) prospect of
external review. Finally, it would be a serious mistake just to assume that the
existence of external review (whether by a tribunal or a court) necessarily
results in those standards being communicated to agency decision-makers.223
Research in Great Britain has shown that the presence and involvement of an
agency officer at the hearing is one of the most important means of facilitating
such feedback.224 Thus, the absence of such a role for the CSA in Australia in
SSAT hearings may be a formidable obstacle to improving ﬁrst-instance
decision-making. Furthermore, the decision simply to bolt on the SSAT
review jurisdiction to the existing CSAprocedures means that the opportunity
218 Undoubtedly there is always scope for improvement: see, eg, W & W (2005) 34 Fam LR 115
as an example of inadequate reasoning by an objections officer.
219 M Adler, ‘Tribunal Reform: Proportionate Dispute Resolution and the Pursuit of
Administrative Justice’ (2006) 69 Mod L Rev 958 at 984.
220 See M Adler, ‘A Socio-Legal Approach to Administrative Justice’ (2003) 25 Law & Policy
323; N Wikeley, ‘Decision-making and the New Tribunals’ (2006) 13 Jnl of Social Security
Law 86; G Richardson and H Genn, ‘Tribunals in Transition: Resolution or Adjudication?’
[2007] Public Law 116 at 125.
221 J L Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: managing social security disability claims, Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1983. On the impact of judicial review in the United
Kingdom, see S Halliday, Judicial Review and Compliance with Administrative Law, Hart
Publishing, Oxford, 2004 and M Hertogh and S Halliday (Eds), Judicial Review and
Bureaucratic Impact, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004.
222 See M Lipsky, Street-level bureaucracy: dilemmas of the individual in public services,
Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1980.
223 See further M Partington and E Kirton-Darling, Developing the Tribunals Service: Research
Issues and Research Lessons — Paper (1): Feedback, Tribunals Service, London, 2006.
224 Ibid. See also Baldwin, Wikeley and Young, above n 211.
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has been missed. However, ﬁne-tuning these existing arrangements, as some
commentators have advocated,225 was never likely to satisfy politicians’
demands for external accountability.
Conclusion
The decision to enlarge the jurisdiction of the SSAT to include merits review
of decisions of the Child Support Agency is not as unproblematic as it has
been presented, as can be demonstrated by reference to the experience in
Great Britain. From its very outset in 1993, the British scheme has involved
external merits review of Child Support Agency decisions by independent
child support tribunals. This has undoubtedly been beneﬁcial in several
respects. It has provided a low cost system of scrutiny of agency decisions by
expert appeal tribunals. Tribunals also offer a relatively accessible appellate
forum when compared with the courts. The further right of appeal in Britain
from the tribunal to the child support commissioners has resulted in the
development of an important body of precedent in child support law.
There are, however, a number of problems with the child support appellate
arrangements in Great Britain. Some of these may be unique to the British
scheme and so may not be replicated in the context of the SSAT in Australia.
For example, there are signiﬁcant delays in hearing child support appeals in
Great Britain, which are in part due to the unduly complex and cumbersome
legislative structure for decision-making and appeals in child support cases
and in part because of operational problems in both the Child SupportAgency
and the tribunal system. Moreover, the absence under the British scheme of
any power for tribunals to consolidate all matters relating to those parties in
one hearing is a serious problem in practice. This provides ample scope for
either party in a child support dispute to wage a campaign of obstruction and
prevarication through manipulation of the decision-making and appeals
system.
There are, however, important similarities between the two schemes. The
most signiﬁcant is the decision to adapt the SSAT model to accommodate
child support reviews. Yet there is a fundamental difficulty with applying the
social security model of an inquisitorial procedure to child support appeals. In
this context the British experience suggests that the notion that the SSAT will
be able to counteract the pervasive culture of adversarialism in family disputes
is a vain hope. For many parents the tribunal simply offers them yet another
forum in which to have their ‘day in court’— with the added bonus that there
are no court fees or legal costs. Indeed, there are several features of the new
review arrangements inAustralia which may actually exacerbate the tendency
to revert to adversarial postures in child support disputes. For example, as we
have seen, the default position is that the agency will not have an officer
present at the SSAT hearing to explain the decision under review. This may
simultaneously both reinforce the parties’ inclination to see the matter in
adversarial terms and undermine the potential for effective feedback to be
communicated to agency decision-makers. There are also other structural
225 See Riethmuller, above n 65, p 96 and Henderson-Kelly, above n 72, p 40.
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proceedings in terms of the parties’ appeal rights. In particular, tribunals deal
with appeals on assessment issues but have no jurisdiction to determine
enforcement matters, which remain ﬁrmly in the domain of the courts. This
raises the spectre of parallel proceedings in tribunals and courts. But the
fundamental difficulty remains the tension between the SSAT’s purportedly
inquisitorial role and the adversarial nature of the great majority of child
support disputes. On this issue the lesson from the British experience is very
clear — the inquisitorial ethos of social security tribunals translates poorly
into the context of child support disputes. In short, you can take an adversarial
horse to the inquisitorial water, but it may refuse to drink.
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Shifting the gaze: Will past violence be
silenced by a further shift of the gaze to
the future under the new family law
system?
Zoe Rathus*
In 2006 the Australian Government instituted a major transformation of the
family law system with the roll out of family relationship centres across the
country and changes to the Family Law Act. This article argues that the new
system will shift the gaze away from the history of the ‘intact family’ in ways
that may be dangerous for women and children who have left domestic
violence. It will suggest that inﬂuences on the practice framework of family
relationship centres may unconsciously exclude discussion of past violence.
Key features of the 2006 Act are also examined and it is suggested that
some of these shift the gaze away from evidence of past violence towards
post-separation events and a new ideal future. The possible limited
effectiveness of the provisions and processes which deal with protection and
family violence is explored. If past violence is not fully ventilated the mother’s
ability to protect the children post-separation will be compromised and
inappropriate and unsafe parenting plans, agreements and orders may be
made.
. . . forget the past, do a deal, go on for the future, the child must have a father . . .1
Introduction
Since 1 July 2006, theAustralian family law system has experienced legal and
institutional transformation by starting the roll out of 65 family relationship
centres and the commencement of the Family Law Amendment (Shared
Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth) (the 2006 Act) — an amendment of
the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). The Federal Government described the 2006
* BA/LLB(Hons), University of Queensland. Senior Lecturer, Law School, Griffith
University; former co-ordinator of the Women’s Legal Service in Brisbane from 1989 to
2004.
1 M Hester and L Radford (with M Føgh, J Humphries, A Mette Kruse, C Pearson, K Qaiser
and K Woodﬁeld), Domestic violence and child contact arrangements in England and
Denmark, The Policy Press, Britain, 1996, p 23. The full quotation is from a welfare officer
interviewed about her or his experiences with the new Children Act 1989 (UK) which had
become operative in 1991:
. . . it was very optimistic, it was Children Act mode forget the past, do a deal, go for the
future, the child must have a father, the highest concept was the child must have contact
with its father, anything, any fears were seen as blocking, as ruling the party.
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